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Introduction: European Security Strategy
ESS - The European Security Strategy (ESS)1 has been approved
by the European Council in December 2003, by document titled
"A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy".
Upon defining the European security and defence politics (ESOP)
in 1998 with the main goal to strengthen outside activities of EU
through creating its own possibilities for outside activities through
development of autonomous civil and military capacities, for inter-
national prevention of confrontations and for crisis management.
ESS is a document which the Europe uses for the first time to cre-
ate its mutual security strategy, and represents the very first official
and systematic display of security-strategic concept of EU.
Document starts with the conclusion that "Europe has never
been so successful, so secure or so free", and ends with the con-
clusion; "The World is filled with new hazards and possibilities".
ESS includes the global challenges and five possible threats to
the European security: terrorism, arms proliferation for mass
destruction, regional conflicts, weak states, i.e. "failed states" and
organized crime. The ESS especially brings out the efficient multi-
lateralism and international law that considers it could offer
appropriate legal framework for usage of force in international
relations.
It introduces new terms of "preventive engagement" (which
includes activities of diplomacy, economic measures, develop-
ment cooperation and humanitarian aid), and "efficient multilat-
eralism"2.
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The ESS document also makes a conclusion that threats in mod-
ern world are "more diverse, less visible and less predictable". It
also claims that "In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be
as much a concern as those that are near. The new threats are
dynamic … The first line of defence shall often be abroad", out-
side the borders of EU and therefore "conflict prevention and
threat prevention cannot start too early."
Therefore the EU took over the "task to promote ring of well
governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the
borders of the Mediterranean". The importance of such politics
illustrates well the example of the Balkans. Because "the credibili-
ty of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our
achievements there". However, the "solution of the Arab/Israeli
confrontation is also strategic priority for the Europe"3.
Moreover, the Europe considers the entire Mediterranean area
as the area of "serious problems of economic stagnation, social
unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests
require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners,
through more effective economic, security and cultural coopera-
tion in the framework of the Barcelona process".
In accordance to the security and defence politics (ESOP) the
EU outside its borders performs operations for peace preserva-
tion, crisis management, as well as operations of peace estab-
lishment. Up till now four operations have been carried out and
11 are in course.4.
(Un)learned lessons or asymmetric threats
We must agree on conclusion that European Union - with 25
Member States, 450 million inhabitants that form one fourth of
the world gross national income - is the world player which
"should be ready to share the responsibility for global security and
building a better world" . The fact the 25 Member States assign
160 billions of Euros for defence politics is a good indicator, as
well as the guarantee, that EU has the strength to resolve all
threats that could endanger its "physical" security: from armed ter-
rorist actions to military and economy threats.
However, in the era of globalization the world actors, as well as
small or large countries, communities or corporations, are dis-
posed to the attacks and threats of some other sort: their values
are attacked, cultures, identity, ways of thinking and living. Those
attacks are harder and harder to defend from. Sometimes, it is
much easier to defend from the physical attacks and threats.
Since, when dominant values are displayed to the attack of the
"soft force", than those attacks can not be defended by hard force.
The good examples of what we are trying to say are events that


























that is not mentioned in the strategic documents and it is impor-
tant for the strategic evaluation. At the end of the 1980s and
beginning at the 1990s the communist system and Warsaw Pact
disintegrated. One of the strongest two military alliances disinte-
grated, where the military assets have not even been used. Why
did the communist system and Warsaw pact disintegrated?
Although everybody coveted, and those that had to live under
such system and those that competed and confronted with it, even
today, there are no reasonable analyses. The majority would
probably agree that this disintegration came unexpectedly and as
the consequence of decanted values it was build on.
What is the conclusion? The largest danger for European secu-
rity is the danger that we can hardly outlive, are threats that threat-
en values on which the Europe rests, or it strives for. Europe can
successfully defend from the outside attacks, with more or less
damage, but how can it defend from its own mistakes, arrogance
and exclusivity that destroy its credibility and reputation?
"We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid
and when necessary, robust intervention"7. We rightfully have to
question what are the goals, i.e. on which values it is allowed to
impose, especially, preventive solutions by military threats, econo-
my sanctions and other different types of political and diplomatic
pressure?
It already became a general placement of the European culture
that violence, especially violence against life, as well as against
peace, is unacceptable as behaviour of the individual and as
much as states. However, the measures of pressure, even those
military interventions and operations that are accepted by the UN
Security Council or NATO, i.e. EU, are "acceptable". More pre-
cisely, in accordance to the regulations of the international law
and conventions there are no sanctions against implementation of
military, especially not a "soft" force and coercion (political, econ-
omy, etc.), to the countries and international organisations
towards disciplinary actions of the certain countries and regimes.
Basically, as much as those actions are justified, sometimes they
are, as shown by the example of Iraq, very questionable in regard
its long-term impacts and consequences which are very often fol-
lowed by undesired social and political consequences that leave
deep wounds and trauma. 
Therefore, the question of European "strategic culture" is of
great importance. Could European strategy be based on the val-
ues of the globalism? Namely, detailed analysis of the strategic
documents would show that globalism values (free market, tech-
nology, information, "free flow of people, goods and capital") are
the values that dominate in such documents. But, as long as those
values could be of the vital interest for the large states and inter-
































nations. The advantages, as well as threats as a consequence of
the global changes, are not equal for small and large countries,
for fewer or numerous nations. This stands for not only the world
outside the EU, but for small and large Member States of EU, and
for countries that wish to join to EU.
EU should count on the fact that there is an asymmetry of threats
in national security of certain countries, where the Member
Countries of EU are also faced with asymmetric threats of their
security by the globalism even when they are placed under the
European umbrella.
The arrogance of large ones and the national interest asym-
metry of the small ones
In European Security Strategy (ESS) Balkans was mentioned seven
times in the following context: "The outbreak of conflict in the
Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our
continent"8, "Balkans criminal network"9, "… to put failed states
back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in
the DRC"10, "… Restoring good government to the Balkans, fos-
tering democracy  …"11, " Problems are rarely solved on a single
country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways
experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows"12, etc.
Those lump sum evaluations "of Balkan" as a problem that is
hard to resolve, and as a threat of the European security, were
undertaken from the documents that preceded the adoption of the
European Security Strategy.
In strategic documentation through alleged analysis of the
cause of the war and wars on the Balkans the arrogance is also
present. So the authors of the "Report of the International
Commission on the Balkans" saw the main causes of the con-
frontations and wars in the area of former Yugoslavia in "return of
the ancient hatred", in "return of the suppressed nations", that is in
confrontation of the "grown wild" nationalisms:
"But, the main causes of this war are in the fact that sparkles of
the aggressive nationalism were fired by those political leaders of
the Yugoslavian Federation that, in their desire to obtain their
nationalistic goals invoked "ancient hatred" and the ones that
intentionally initiated their propaganda machinery in order to jus-
tify something that can not be justified: the usage of the violence
for purpose of taking over the territory, deportation of "other"
nations and resuming the authoritarian government constitu-
tion"13.
Beginning with the belief that the "prevailing mentality on the
Balkans is one continuous peace threat, the terrifying example of
intolerance and shame for the Europe"14 the International
Commission for Balkans came to conclusion that in the area of26
the former Yugoslavia, which they continually call Balkans, and
where by their opinion, live "Balkans nations", "a Third Balkans
War" took place. In order to place this "European shame" under
the control, the Tindemans Commission formed their report in 57
recommendations which are "intended for the west governments
and non-government organisations in region"15. 
First thirty recommendations are related to certain countries "at
the Balkans", where the recommendations from 31 to 57 articu-
late the measure and procedures for obtaining the "creation of the
Southern Balkans Confederation".
Such starting point of the International Commission for Balkans
referring to the causes and the reasons of disintegration of
Yugoslavia, from the historical and political point of view is mis-
leading. From the social point of view it is humiliating and insult-
ing for the nations that fought for national freedom and their
country to set themselves free from communist and from Yugoslav
unitary regime, which is also unsupported from the position of the-
ory and facts which is proved enough by the simple fact: at the
end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s resulted with 15
new countries in Europe. This process is continued even after year
2000 when Montenegro became independent and sovereign
country.
This kind of status is expected for the Kosovo as well. Are all of
these states the result of the "aggressive nationalism, "ancient
hatred" or an act of the "propaganda machinery"?
Today's confrontations between Walloons and Flemings in
Belgium broke out to the surface in the very heart of the European
Union. Is this the matter of the "aggressive nationalism" and
"ancient hatred" as well? Hardly.
It is more likely that it is the matter of the repudiation of the
rights of small nations to freedom and independency, as from the
hegemonistic actors in multinational communities, as much as the
international actors - "keepers" of the actual international order.
Maybe some "Balkans states" have stumbled, they probably still
have not established democratic standards as developed
European countries, but new states in the area of formed
Yugoslavia are established as a result of the national democratic
movements and are free of Yugoslav unitary order as well as com-
munist system without any help, and once beside help of some
European countries.
Therefore, the underestimation of the national independency
and freedom of the new states undermines the credibility of the
European actors with small nations that are proud on their dem-
ocratic achievements in given circumstances. 
The events in Europe at the end of the 20th Century only con-
firmed the historical and political fact, which is the consequence
































of the international order: 
a) The world is in the process of versatile international
and regional integrations, yet in the same time, more and more
nationally individualized; multinational countries are disintegrated
and (small) nations gain their sovereignty in their own state and in
membership of international organizations; fundamental ideals in
strategy of democratic movements are national freedom, inde-
pendency, sovereign state and international recognition;
b) Multinational states constituted as unitary community,
i.e. on hegemony of one nation, can survive only through force
and they are not democratic, because every constitutive nation
can not achieve their national freedom and interest. 
Due to the different reasons, the confirmation of these attitudes
does not have its place in the strategic documents.
Misunderstanding of these crucial events that occurred at the end
of the 20th Century, the processes that resulted in establishment
of 15 new states in Europe, could illustrate, what it appears to be
misunderstanding in "terminology" which carries even possible
deeper misconceptions. 
Namely, Croatia, in its political, historical and at least geo-
graphic sense has never been the part of the Balkans nor West
Balkans. It became as such just in year 2000 by means of the
political engineering of EU when the summit of "the largest con-
ference of statesman in history of Croatia on West Balkans17" was
held in Zagreb.
One strategic document that preceded the summit in Zagreb,
precisely explains why EU uses the term Balkans: "The usage of the
term "South-Eastern Europe" instead of the term "Western Balkans"
implied to the acknowledgement of the fact that this region is
already part of the Europe and that its problems are problems of
the Europe, and that any sustainable solution must be European
solution that would include dependency on Union and its enlarge-
ment"18. 
For EU, Western Balkans could represent a "technical term"
which, as explained, implies to the fact that "this region" is not a
part of the Europe and that Balkans problems are not European
problems. For such concept, the bureaucracy of EU obtained rul-
ing elite in Croatia and maybe with more or less success, the elites
in other countries of "Western Balkans". However, it is the fact that
Croatian citizens and Croatian nation shall not agree on such
judgement of values because they have historically and political-
ly, as well as geographically19 always considered Croatia as part
of the Middle-European or Mediterranean country. 
Therefore, we have the right to ask the question: is it justified
and politically wise to impose such solutions which implication of
values could be the cause of new misunderstandings in the future?




























that it will be, because Croatia belongs there. As for the Croatian
national and cultural identity it is not very good to be pushed
where she does not want to be20; similarly it is not desirable for
the credibility of EU to impose wrong solutions or the solutions
made in a hurry to the one (still) not willing to accept the its mem-
bership.
The violence of the global
The EU outside its borders is planning and implementing opera-
tions for peace preservation, crisis management and operations
of peace establishment. Such strategy is based on the modern
comprehension and logic of the "great strategy", for which the
goal of the international politics is not war but establishment of the
good peace. Today's goal of the European politics is to avoid war
at any price. McNamara is even more specific: "Today, there are
no such thing as military strategy, there is only crisis management".
It is necessary to be reminded to the "scientific basis" which is the
foundation for operations for crisis management. According to the
Riemann model "the settling of the confrontation": the actors
should be imposed by outside conditions that "disable/to come
to/the sustainable development where everybody wins … There is
no requirement of justice or solution for the cause of the con-
frontation, but tends to affect the actors offering them certain ben-
efits for withdrawal from the confrontation" .21
Global strategists and crisis managers do not "seek justice or
solution for the cause of the confrontation", they request from the
actor to withdraw from its values and interests.
One of the main arms that are used for the crisis management
is a "soft" force. The public diplomacy means the usage of the "soft
power", i.e. media, non-government organisations, exchange of
experts, etc. with the goal: to force the others to behave in the way
that suits us (and otherwise they would not behave in this way) .22
The effects of the public diplomacy in European dimensions are
not a secret. It is publicly spoken about government changes in
certain transition states per "Slovakian model", "Bulgarian model",
"Croatian model", etc..
The usage of the media by the public diplomacy is not a secret
as well; information wars are led with the goal for obtaining the
dominancy of own information, i.e. how to force the opponent to
change his decisions on his own damage23. The postulate for
such actions is hidden in the thesis: "the picture is more important
that the truth" and "the future is more important than the past". 
International Haag Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is also
one of the "instruments for imposition of the peace" and not for the
establishment of justice. (This is the reason why the verdicts fol-
lowed the logic of political verdicts and rewards in order to disci-29
pline "Balkans countries and nations". From the justice point of
view ICTY is an international failure. If it was wanted to achieve
justice and punish the crimes, the punishment should be left to the
national courts where the ICTY could have been the higher cor-
rective instance).
There is a range of examples that could confirm only the
processes that occur: universal values - freedom, human dignity,
truth, justice, culture - which were the basis for the international
order after World War II. and their definition in the UN charter
from 1948, are "getting old".
Globalisation is the new world process that is not the question
of choice but it is inevitable. This process is imposing new values:
market, technology, information, tourism.
At the same time globalists have given up primary human rights:
freedom, truth, justice, man dignity. Instead, they offer "new
human rights": free flow of money, goods and services. 
Recently deceased French philosopher Jean Baudrilliard was
right when he claimed that there is no analogy between terms
"global" and "universal". The human rights, freedom, culture and
democracy are universal values. Opposite to that, the technology,
market, tourism and information are global values. Our societies
and cultures vanish in the global, because we lost our own singu-
larity and given up on our own values. 
Security strategies of the large forces, such as EU, shall suc-
cessfully defend from all outside and "physical" threats. The prob-
lem is whether they will find the "balance" between the universal
and global values?
Through the ESS and public diplomacy, small nations and their
interest sphere in EU are imposed by advantages and benefits
brought by "global" values. 
Those advantages can not be denied and sometimes they are
hard to refuse. But it is the question of the price that they must pay.
Is the price to give up on the universal values?
New states on the European ground did not have the chance to
build firm mechanisms of the national security and therefore the
impact of the global values to their national and cultural identity
could be much more destructive than those of countries with long
tradition of security culture.
What can we do? The globalisation is inevitable. Similarly as the
industrialisation two Centuries ago. Because no one considered
the negative effects of the industrialisation, the world in the last 50
years had to deal with rectifying of ecological disasters and dam-
ages "produced" by uncontrolled desire for wealth and growth.
Some of the industrialisation consequences are impossible to rec-
tify.
Shall we be able to avoid negative globalisation consequences




























values are not. We must accept the world that is permanently inte-
grating, but nationally individualizing as well. Therefore there
must be a balance between global and universal values.
Globalisation is a world networking upon variety of foundations,
but the nodes around which and for which the world integrates are
universal values. Today, this balance does not exist: universal val-
ues are suppressed to strategic plans of great ones.
By its origination the National Associations of the War Veterans
are predetermined to be the bearers of the universal values: free-
dom, independency, man dignity, homeland, and respect for the
victim that was paid for those values. This is the reason those
associations take care of traditions and symbols of the national
and cultural identity of their nations.  
Countries with the long tradition of veterans should use their
experience to offer help to the new Europe states, to the transition
countries also, so that the organisations of the war veterans could
obtain crucial place not just among NGO but as the part of every
state politics. 
If we wish to build Europe on the variety of differences, different
national identities and cultures, it can not be built without partici-
pation of the organisations of war veterans. Similarly, strategies
and politics that international actors shall bring without accept-
ance and participation of the "failed" countries, to which they shall
apply the means of "soft" and "hard" force, will have only short-
term success, as well as long-tern negative consequences.
In order to avoid negative consequences of the strategic plans
we should move step further. Today, long-term goals of develop-
ment and strategic plans are privilege of large and developed
ones. Small countries and undeveloped countries do not have
adequate infrastructure for strategic opinion and planning. If it is
true that today's world is networking on different foundations, than
it would be reasonable to create a network of strategic centres in
those countries that have mutual interests and needs for mutual
connecting. If this is about European countries and interests than
it does not matter if all of those countries are on this or other side
of the Schengen border.
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East became unpopular on the West. American started to use
terms "system of values", information politic and recent "pub-
lic diplomacy".
23. "...in its essence, is about ideas and epistemology -- big words
meaning that information warfare is about the way humans
think and, more importantly, the way humans make deci-
sions." (Stein, 1995, p. 32) 
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